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ABSTRACT
Following the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011, the authoritarian regimes of the Middle
East were expected to crumble while paving the pathway to democratization. Yet many of these
regimes have remarkably survived. Even the regimes that had been toppled following popular

protests were displaced by more repressive regimes characterized by the same form of rule as
their predecessors. A prominent example of this pattern is Mubarak’s regime that was initially
displaced by Morsi’s democratically elected government until it was overthrown by a coup
spearheaded by General Sisi and replaced with a military dictatorship that persists today. The
number of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East today is no different than it was pre-2011,
hence the purpose of this thesis is to explore the factors that contribute to the resiliency of
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. This will be achieved by comparing two different
variants of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East that have experienced similar outcomes,
regime survival. Utilizing primary language sources, this thesis will examine (a) Syria that
represents an authoritarian regime characterized by republican rule and (b) Jordan an
authoritarian regime characterized by monarchical rule (linchpin monarchy).
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly a decade has passed since the events of the Arab Spring have unfolded in 2011,
yet the political landscape of the Middle East remains largely unchanged. The self-immolation of
Mohamed Bouazizi triggered a revolutionary bandwagon that propelled across the Arab World,
mobilizing thousands if not millions against the authoritarian regimes and ruthless dictators of
the region. The events of such a phenomenon mirrored that of the 1989 revolutions that toppled
the communist regimes of the Soviet satellite states, hence it was expected by scholars and
experts that the Arab Spring would finally pave a pathway for democratization of the Middle
East. However, what they failed to anticipate was the degree of resiliency concerning
authoritarian rule in the region, that allowed the status quo to remain virtually untouched. In fact,

the events of the Arab Spring wreaked havoc that further destabilized the region, for instance the
popular protests witnessed in Syria and Libya yielded mass-scale violence that rapidly escalated
into civil war dragging both countries in turmoil and ultimately rendering them as failed states,
that continue to struggle in administering authority over their national territories.
In the events that popular mobilization did indeed successfully topple an authoritarian
regime, it was nonetheless replaced by a regime that was perhaps more repressive and
authoritarian than its predecessor, as the newly installed regimes failed to implement the reform
and changes demanded by the protestors, instead their rule mirrored that of their forerunner.
Such was the case with the ‘Egyptian revolution’ that toppled Hosni Mubarak and displaced him
with the first ‘democratically elected’ president, Mohammad Morsi. As Morsi’s rule proved to be
no different than Mubarak’s as he engaged in similar dictatorial behavior, thus resulting in a

1

second wave of massive public protests calling for his resignation. This resulted in a military
coup that imprisoned and trialed Morsi, while displacing him with general Abdelfattah Sisi,
whose regime characterized by a form of military dictatorship displayed a greater degree of
repression and brutality than both of his predecessors.
The outcome of the Arab Spring while it may have not led to democratization, seems to
capture the true resilient nature of authoritarianism in the Middle East, highlighted by the
willingness of the heads of some of these regimes such as Syria to pursue extreme brutalized
repressive channels in order to preserve the status quo, while others such as Jordan and Morocco
have avoided violence to a certain extent and an existential threat through some reforms to
appease dissent. Hence, explaining why the Middle East is perhaps the only region in the world
during the contemporary period that has failed to fully embrace a wave of democratization. The

Middle East continues to serve as the global beacon for authoritarian rule as it currently houses
the largest number of authoritarian regimes in the world, not to mention the fact that it has been
resilient to all recorded waves of democratization in history.
The nature of authoritarianism and its resiliency in the Middle East is not simple, rather
multilayered and complicated involving a multitude of factors such as type of regime, size and
composition of population, foreign support, state capacity among others. Furthermore, the degree
of authoritarianism employed within a regime differs across the Middle East, for some regimes
maybe highly authoritarian and repressive while others are semi-authoritarian. It must be
considered that authoritarian rule in the Middle East is expressed through different forms
contingent on regime type, broadly speaking regimes in the Middle East may be categorized as
either a republic or monarchy. However, further variations exist within each category that exhibit
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a unique form of authoritarian rule accordingly, for instance the Egyptian regime under Mubarak
can be categorized as a “military led autocracy” that is defined by Geddes, Frantz, and Wright as
a form of “autocratic rule led by a member of the military.”1 Such a form of rule entails two
dimensions “military regime” that involves the domination of the policy making process by a
group of military officers, as well as “military strongman style” rule where a dictatorship exists
that is controlled by a military officer unrestrained by other elite elements.2 The military led
autocracy in Egypt can be traced back to 1952 following the coup d’état led by the Free Officers
Corp that toppled the puppet monarchy and displaced it with a military dictatorship under Gamal
Abdul Nasser, since then the Egyptian military has evolved as a powerful institution with a firm
grip over Egyptian politics, economy and society.
Another form of authoritarian rule that categorizes republican regimes in the Middle East

is one characterized by a highly personalistic/ sultanstic style of rule, such as that of the Syrian
regime under the Assad family and Libya under Gadhafi. Such regimes revolve around the ruler
and his highly personalistic style of rule absent of any ideology or commitment to any system of
values resulting in the creation of cult of personality, according to Chehabi and Linz “the ruler
exercises his power without restraint, at his own discretion and above all unencumbered by rules
or by any commitment to an ideology or value system.”3 Gaddhafi was notorious for juggling
around different ideologies at various stages of his reign in order to garner support, for instance

1

Geddes, B. Frantz, E. Wright, J. (2014). “Military Rule”. Annual Review of Political
Science 17 (2014): 147-162. (p.152). Retrieved from: https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurevpolisci-032211-213418
2
Ibid
3
Chehabi, H. E. Linz, J. (1998). “Sultanstic Regimes”, A Theory of Sultanism. The John Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore and London. (p.9).
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hosting a conference in Benghazi of nearly all African leaders in celebration of Pan Africanism
and calling for African unity while being crowned “King of Kings”4. Sultanstic regimes are
further characterized by high levels of corruption and patrimonialism as the mechanism of
bureaucratic administration is continuously undermined by the ruler’s personal arbitrary
decisions, hence positions in the regime are recruited directly by the ruler along patrimonial lines
rather than being based on qualifications. This is evident in the Syrian regime under Hafez Al
Assad who regularly appointed close family members and friends in senior positions within his
regime, for instance he appointed a trusted friend as a commander within the Syrian Air Force
despite not being qualified as a pilot.5
Middle Eastern monarchies can be divided into two distinct archetypes entailing the
dynastic and linchpin monarchies. The former variant is best described by Herb as the

domination of the state by the ruling family6, this is achieved by the complete monopolization of
the governing institutions and bureaucratic affairs of the state by the ruling family. In addition,
mechanisms are developed to distribute and redistribute political power among members of the
ruling family thus excluding the involvement of external actors such as other elites, this is further
fortified by the hereditary mechanism that facilitates the succession of the throne to other
members of the dynasty following the death of the monarch. Dynastic monarchies are common
among all Gulf monarchies yet it originated in Kuwait in 1938 when Al Sabah the emir dissolved

4

Chothia, F. (October 21st, 2011). “What does Gaddafi's death mean for Africa?”. BBC News. Retrieved from:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15392189
5
Bellin, E. (2004). “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative
Perspective”. Comparative Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 139-157. (p.149). Retrieved from:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4150140.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A60c4a4105ed234bb4a71ff2c00901a3b
6
Herb, M. (1999). “All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution and Democracy in Middle Eastern Monarchies”. State
University of New York Press. (p.3).
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parliament resulting in the subsequent takeover of his family over key state ministries and posts.
The latter form of a Middle Eastern monarchy that is non dynastic based on Herbs classifications
is termed as linchpin monarchies. According to Russell Lucas, in this variant of a monarchy, the
ruling family does not monopolize all head positions in government yet limits participation to
political institutions. The monarch places himself above routine politics and relegates the
responsibilities for such affairs to a parliament. He also encourages “social pluralism and
mobilize it along vertical lines to participate in the governing of the state, underneath the
leadership of the monarchy”.7
Henceforth, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the factors contributing to the
resiliency of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. This will be achieved through a
comparative examination of two different variants of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East

that exhibited regime resiliency. Both, Syria and Jordan have ultimately shared similar outcomes
in terms of regime survival specifically in light of the greatest challenge that has faced and even
toppled several Arab autocratic regimes in the region, the Arab Spring. This will be further
discussed in the research design section below.
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Lucas, R. (2004). Monarchical Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern Regime
Type. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36(1), 103-119. (p.108). Retrieved from:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3880140
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCY

The persistent nature of authoritarianism in the Middle East has been the subject of
scholarly debate since the late 20th century. The third wave of democratization rose in Southern
Europe in the 1970s and Latin America during the 1980s propelling a democratic wave across
different parts of the world, including the heart of the communist sphere in Eastern Europe
during the late 1980s and early 1990s8. However, the Middle East skipped out on the third wave
of democratization, as no noticeable regime change let alone a regional shift in the political arena
from repressive authoritarianism to democratic liberalization took place. Such global events
seem to highlight or at least draw attention to the resilient nature of authoritarianism in the
Middle East when it comes to political liberalization and democratization. This has been further

evident following the series of Arab uprisings that erupted in late 2010 that would form what is
known as the Arab Spring, arguably the first regional wave of democratization through mass
popular mobilization against despotic rulers and regimes. Yet these uprisings ultimately resulted
in the widening of authoritarian activity in the region through brutally repressive means that
wreaked havoc on the Middle East and its fragile state of stability.
The existing literature examines authoritarianism in the Middle East through the
consideration of various factors, with different researchers placing an emphasis on a specific
factor that is said to serve as the central force driving regime resiliency, ranging from the state
coercive apparatus to elite coalitions and claims to legitimacy among other unique factors. In
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Posusney, M. (2004). “Enduring Authoritarianism: Middle East Lessons for Comparative Theory”. Comparative
Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 127-138. (p.127). Retrieved from:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4150139.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A8101de978fd1cf16dc0b49c424894f41
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most Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes, political power is concentrated in a single figure, for
instance Egypt under Mubarak and Sisi (while a military oligarchy is arguably present, Sisi
remains the figure of supreme authority), Libya under Gadhafi, Tunisia under Bin Ali and
virtually all Arab monarchies. The conceptualization of proposed factors relating to authoritarian
regimes is contingent upon their attribution broadly to either legitimation, repression, or
cooptation.
Legitimation
Gerschewski claims that legitimation, repression and co-optation are the key factors of
reenforcing stability in autocratic regimes. Legitimation is utilized as a means of measuring and
assuring “active consent, compliance with the rules, passive obedience, or mere toleration within
the population”9, its primary function is gaining support for the political elite from the masses

through the motivation of righteousness. The demand for legitimation within autocratic regimes
is derived from the assumption that the persistence of modern autocracies can no longer be solely
reliant on a purely repressive style of control, where the ruler asserts unrestrained control over
the ruled without the considerations of the ruled. Modern autocrats must structure their rule
based on the interdependencies that classify the relationship between the ruler and the ruled,
resulting in some form of social contract10. A social contract in this context refers to a form of a
reciprocal relationship between the rulers and the ruled whereby passive support for the rulers is
provided in exchange for economic or material benefits and stability for the ruled, thus

9

Gerschewski, J. (2013). “The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic
regimes”. Democratization, 20:1, 13-38. (p. 18). Retrieved from:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13510347.2013.738860?needAccess=true
10
Ibid., 19.
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guaranteeing the political isolation of the public sphere. For instance, this can be observed during
the events of the Arab Spring, where political and regime stability in the authoritarian states of
Egypt and Tunisia were contingent on such reciprocal relationships between the rulers and the
ruled facilitated by a social contract11. Nonetheless, when the structure of the social contract
collapsed as a result of the withdrawal of consent by the ruled given a myriad of unaddressed
grievances, dissent was catalyzed and ultimately surfaced thus resulting in mass popular
mobilization against the rulers.
Furthermore, legitimation is employed by Middle Eastern monarchs to justify their rule
through an allusion to religious and/or cultural claims. For instance, the Hashemite dynasty in
Jordan seeks to derive its legitimacy from genealogical links and ancestry to Prophet
Muhammad.12 The royal family bears the title of sharif or noble and claims to be direct

descendants of Al-Hasan, the son of Fatimah, daughter of Prophet Muhammad, hence granting
themselves a special right to govern under Islamic law and tradition13. As a result, such lineage
has endowed special religious titles and duties on the Hashemites such as stewardship of the holy
sites in Mecca and Medina since the 10th century, as well as occupying the title of sharif of
Mecca up until their defeat by the emerging Saud dynasty in 192414, not to mention custodial
duties for Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem up until present day. Such claims by the

11

Ibid., 19.
Anderson, L. (1991). “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East”. Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. 106, No. 1, pp. 1-15. (p.11). Retrieved from:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2152171.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aef793d8ef6754ed8955f0c3bc5ff631f
13
Wroblewski, B. (2016). “The Mystery of Political Stability in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Monarchy and
the Crisis of State Governance in the Arab World”. The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs;
Warsaw Vol. 25, Iss. 4: 7-29. (p.10). Retrieved from:
https://www.proquest.com/docview/1894921819/fulltextPDF/6481214B9F2049A9PQ/1?accountid=10003
14
Ibid., 11.
12
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Hashemites were essential in consolidating their rule and gaining superiority over other tribes in
the collective region of the Middle East and North Africa. Such claims have historically and
continue to facilitate Hashemite dynastical rule through the employment of religion, that is held
as a supreme cultural entity in the Middle East as legitimizing their rule in a manner that is
parallel to the ancient divine right in the eyes of the ruled, a majority of whom share the same
Islamic identity and hold religion to a high personal value, at least that is how they appear and
behave in public. In fact, the Hashemite monarchy continually reminds its population of its
special religious titles and genealogical links to the Prophet Muhammad as means of legitimizing
their rule in the eyes of a highly conservative and religious society, for instance the employment
of expressions and phrases in speeches where King Abdullah II addresses his nation by praying
to Prophet Muhammad and referring to him as the “Arab Hashemite Prophet”, a title that has

been exclusively utilized by the Hashemites.
Nonetheless, legitimation specifically in the authoritarian framework faces significant
challenges concerning its validity and accuracy, for it is difficult to empirically and accurately
measure the notion of legitimate rule in autocratic and authoritarian regimes. In Ambiguities of
Domination: Politic, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, Lisa Wedeen explores the
gap between the image and overall legitimacy presented by Syrian President Hafiz Al Assad and
his actual perception by Syrians including the degree to which Assad’s rule is considered
legitimate as painted by his regime. Hafiz Al Assad maintained a cult of personality reinforced
by the state propaganda apparatus (state owned media entailing news channels, magazines, and
newspapers) that depict Assad as a hyper glorified icon that is omnipresent and omniscient,
much like the depictions of Kim Jung Un in North Korea. “In newspaper photographs he appears
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as the "father," the "combatant," the "first teacher," the "savior of Lebanon," the "leader forever,"
or the "gallant knight," a transparent reference to the modern-day Salah alDin”15. Despite such
images and symbolism, Wedeen suggests that the depiction of Assad in Syrian society is merely
a façade as no one would actually believe the holiness and omniscience of Assad that highlight
his immortality or God-like presence. Rather, Assad’s cult of personality manifests a general
atmosphere of skeptical ambivalence that attends the practice of politics in Syria”16. Spectacles
relating to the glorification of Assad and the fortification of his cult of personality are typically
organized by agents affiliated with the regime, they additionally devise strategies for enforcing
attendance at events celebrating Assad or the regime, for instance members of the Baathist party
are known to close down university gates to prevent students from leaving then escort them unto
buses that would transport them to celebrations reveling the president.17

The cult of personality is additionally fortified by the regime’s instrumentalization of
repression, the threat of coercive power by the regime facilitates the function of the cult of
personality in terms of sustaining the rule of the regime regardless of whether legitimacy claims
are actually believed by the population. For instance, as long as the threat and actual use of force
such as detainment, torture, exile or death by the regime against dissidents who dare to openly
challenge the legitimacy of the cult of personality exists, then the integrity of the cult of
personality at least in the open public sphere is preserved as it is not viable for dissidents to
openly challenge the cult of personality given the high risks of repression. However, in the case

15

Wedeen, L. (1999). Ambiguities of Domination: Politic, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria. The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, Ch.1 “Believing in Spectacles”. (p.1).
16
Ibid, 2.
17
Ibid, 2-3.
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that repressive capacity and use of force by the regime is not sufficient to contain dissidence then
it is highly likely that dissidence would erupt, thus exposing the fabricated nature of the cult of
personality and its failure as a mechanism of regime resiliency. That is exactly what happened
during the 2011 uprising when mass demonstrations overwhelmed the coercive apparatus in
many different parts of the country and destroyed the most conspicuous symbols of the cult of
personality (i.e., statues of Hafez Assad).
Similarly, the legitimacy of Hashemite rule in Jordan is exaggerated and reinforced by
regime elements such as state-owned social media channels that glorify the Hashemite dynasty
under the guise of hyper nationalism and patriotism. The so-called patriots that run such channels
claim to be independent from the state and regime, yet disseminate elements of propaganda
nearly immediately as state owned pages and channels publish theirs in a manner that is

suspicious. Hence implying that such ‘independent’ nationalist social media channels are either
state owned or their operators are paid and employed by the state to remit propaganda onto a
wider audience. Furthermore, the cult of personality present in the Jordanian regime relies on
repression as a pillar of support similar to that of Assad’s regime, security forces possess nearly
unrestricted power in monitoring and cracking down on all forms of dissent aimed at King
Abdullah II and his family. Security forces, most notably the infamous mukhabarat closely
monitor and censor all forms of dissent both online and publicly. Multiple reports that detail the
detainment, beating and mistrial of individuals voicing their opposition against the regime and
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government are common. For instance, several dozens of pro-reform peaceful protestors were
detained and brutally beaten by Gendarme forces for allegedly ‘insulting’ the king in 2012.18
Gerschewski claims that legitimation is measured based on the performance of the regime
economically, socially and maintaining public order.19 Hence the higher a regime performs the
greater degree of fulfillment it achieves of the social contract. Yet that is not necessarily the case
as authoritarian regimes typically employ significant degrees of repression in order to maintain
their persistence, thus resulting in the phenomenon known as “preference falsification”20, this
involves a relationship between an individual’s private and public preferences. For instance, an
individual supporting the overthrow of a government may not publicly display his antigovernment sentiments in any form given the fear of being persecuted by the government.
Instead, such an individual may publicly display pro government sentiments by attending

nationalist rallies and sharing pro government propaganda (public preference) despite actually
being anti-government (private preference). Therefore, a sharp disparity exists between the
individuals private and public preferences thus constituting preference falsification. Kuran’s
conceptualization of preference falsification is consistent with Wedeen’s observations
concerning the Assad regime as noted in Ambiguities of Domination: Politic, Rhetoric, and
Symbols in Contemporary Syria from a theoretical perspective. Wedeen mentions a sharp gap

18

(April 3rd, 2012). “Jordan: Pro-reformists detained for ‘insulting’ the King must be released”. Amnesty
International. Retrieved from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/04/jordan-pro-reformistsdetained-insulting-king-must-be-released/
19
Gerschewski, J. (2013). “The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic
regimes”. Democratization, 20:1, 13-38. (p. 20). Retrieved from:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13510347.2013.738860?needAccess=true
20
Kuran, T. (1991). “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989”. World
Politics, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Oct., 1991), pp. 7-48. (p.17). Retrieved from:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2010422.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae7b47f4439358806b8fffcb7706c28ef
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that exists between the symbolism and image maintained and portrayed by the Assad regime
entailing his cult of personality, and what Syrians genuinely believe in regards to such imagery
and legitimacy claims. This divide is parallel to that between public and private preferences and
as well as their relation to preference falsification as discussed by Kuran, the cult of personality
of Assad as sustained by his regime through the threat of use of coercive force serves to generate
the public preference of Syrians that is said to encompass public support and admiration of
Assad. Nevertheless, Weeden suggests that it is impractical to assume that such legitimacy
claims are believed by the public thus implying the fabricated nature of Assad’s cult of
personality, in fact it is highly likely that most Syrians reject such claims and acknowledge their
fabricated nature as any rational human would yet they refrain from publicizing such sentiments
in fear of persecution by the regime, thus representing their private preferences.

Consequently, measuring the attitudes of the public within an authoritarian state towards
the regime and rulers that govern them as an indicator of legitimacy (e.g., via public opinion
surveys), it is highly likely that answers will be extremely biased and skewed in favor of the
regime while failing to mirror actual sentiments of the public given fears of government
persecution and the mechanics of preference falsification as mentioned earlier. Consequently, the
eruption of mass protests, as happened in Syria in 2011, could come as a complete surprise.
Based on the previous theoretical discussion concerning legitimation, it can be
anticipated that legitimation serves as an essential pillar of stability in the Jordanian regime that
has historically been image conscious. The religious titles and claimed genealogical links to
Prophet Muhammad have been continuously instrumentalized by the Hashemites in justifying
their right to the throne, and power compared to other Arab tribes in the region. This strategy of
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legitimation is specifically relevant and potentially effective in a society that can be classified as
highly religious and conservative where such claims allude to shared religious values of the
people. On the other hand, in Syria it can be anticipated that legitimation is not as effective or
nearly as crucial to the stability of the Syrian regime compared to the Jordanian regime given the
brutal history behind Assad’s ascension to power. Not to mention the dynamics of the
ethnic/religious identity of the ruling family compared to the majority of the population in Syria,
where the Assads identify as Alawis (an ethnic religious minority) and governs over an
ethnically and religiously diverse population that is primarily composed of Sunni Arabs.
Repression
Repression is the defining feature of autocracies and central to their survival. EscribàFolch concluded that “repression does work. In other words, it significantly reduces the

likelihood that a dictator will be replaced in a given year”21. Repression can be defined as “actual
or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring
specific activities”22, its main functions is channeling the demands of the regime elite through
generating a political culture at both the elite and popular levels based on the threat of the use of
force by the state. Repression is an effective mechanism for stability but also highly costly. Thus,
repression alone fails to guarantee regime survival on the long run, specifically in times of

21

Escribà-Folch, A. (2013). “Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy”. International Political
Science Review, 34(5) 543–560. (p.556). Retrieved from:
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0192512113488259
22
Gerschewski, J. (2013). “The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic
regimes”. Democratization, 20:1, 13-38. (p. 21). Retrieved from:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13510347.2013.738860?needAccess=true
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economic downturns where the regime fails to afford the material incentives that its repressive
apparatus relies on, such as pay for security forces.
Repression can be divided into two subtypes that of high intensity and low intensity
based on Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s assertions in Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid
Regimes after the Cold War23 , the former subtype involves state coercive activity targeting high
profile targets such as oppositional leaders, large groups of people such as demonstrators and
dissidents, or even opposition organizations. On the one hand, high intensity repression is
measured through the frequency of repression of mass demonstrators, violent operations against
organized opposition parties including murder, imprisonment or exile of oppositional leaders. On
the other hand, low intensity repression is less visible and subtle compared to high intensity
repression. Such repressive activity is said to be measured through the presence of a surveillance

system, intimidation and physical harassment tactics, as well as infringement upon civil liberties
such as freedom to assembly, not to mention restricting and even denying education or
employment opportunities. Data highlighting both low and high intensity repression within
countries can be found at the Freedom House, The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset,
and the Political Terror Scale project24. Based on most recent data compiled from human rights
reports from Amnesty, Human Rights Watch and the US Department of State, Jordan scored a
value of 3 on the Political Terror Scale, indicating “extensive political imprisonment, or a recent
history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be

23

Levitsky, S. & Way, L. (2010). “Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War”. Cambridge
University Press
24
Gerschewski, J. (2013). “The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic
regimes”. Democratization, 20:1, 13-38. (p. 21). Retrieved from:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13510347.2013.738860?needAccess=true
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common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.”25 Hence,
suggesting the presence of moderate levels of repression. Syria scored a value of 5, the highest
possible score on the Political Terror Scale indicating “terror has expanded to the whole
population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with
which they pursue personal or ideological goals.” 26 Thus, these numbers suggest extremely high
levels of repression.
Repression has proven to be an instrumental mechanism for reinforcing authoritarian
regime rule and thus contributing to the resilience of authoritarianism in the Middle East. The
use of repression by the authoritarian states of the Middle East is embodied by the employment
of a complex intertwined system of state security, military and intelligence forces all operating
under the command of the autocrat in what is termed as the coercive apparatus. Bellin

summarizes the extensive literature on the coercive apparatus suggesting that regime survival is
contingent upon the state’s capacity in sustaining its monopoly on coercion27. She adds that the
will of the state in crushing opposition and dissent through its coercive apparatus is equally as
significant as possessing the capacity to do so, for the regime may not survive if it lacks one or
the other. For instance, to draw upon the conceptual distinction between will and capacity, Bellin
presents a case where a regime has the capacity yet not the will such as South Korea under Roh
Tae Woo in 1987. Similarly, Egypt under Mubarak possessed the capacity to suppress the 2011
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protests in the wake of Arab Uprisings, yet the military establishment ultimately decided to
dissociate with the dictator. If the establishment had decided to act otherwise and used extensive
coercion, it would have arguably prevented the demise of Mubarak’s reign. On the other hand, a
regime may possess the will yet lacks the capacity to crush opposition as was the case in Benin
under Kerekou in 1989. It can be argued that Libya under Gaddafi falls under this pattern during
its experience with the Arab Uprisings, Gadhafi notoriously stated his intention in a national
address to hunt down and eliminate every revolutionary that he labeled as traitors in every
neighborhood and corner in Libya. However, his capacity to crush opposition was heavily
hindered given foreign actors supplying and arming opposition militias, not to mention the
NATO coalition bombings that crippled Gaddafi’s forces and ultimately brought about his
gruesome public demise.

Syria presents a unique case study for such a pattern as the Assad regime has explicitly
demonstrated its will to crush all forms of opposition irrespective of the costs incurred both
domestically as well as internationally, the Syrian regime is notorious for maintaining a
formidable repressive apparatus yet its capacity has been hindered and bolstered by a multiplicity
of factors at various stages during the civil war such as the fragmentation of the Syrian Armed
Forces due to mass defections, the rise of ISIS, and foreign intervention (NATO airstrikes, fiscal
and military support to the Assad regime by its allies Iran and Russia, and material support for
various oppositional Sunni militias by foreign actors such as Saudi Arabia and UAE).
Consequently, given the complicated state of conflict in Syria that has been ongoing since 2011,
the Assad regime continues to persist while failing to fully contain and repress opposition, thus
struggling to fully restore regime authority across the country and win the civil war decisively.
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Overall, in comparison to the Qaddafi regime, the ability of the Assad regime to obtain support
from powerful external states such as Russia and Iran, was central to its ability to stay in power.
The coercive apparatus is dependent on various conditions in order to effectively persist
entailing a continuous flow of adequate material funding, webs of international support, and low
levels of institutionalization compounded by patrimonialism. Other factors additionally influence
the functioning and structure of the coercive apparatus, in “Reconsidering the Robustness of
Authoritarianism in the Middle East Lessons from the Arab Spring” Bellin highlights the
importance of the coercive apparatus’s loyalty or defection to the regime, specifically the
military as regime survival among those that experienced mass popular mobilizations during the
onset of the Arab Uprisings can be boiled down to one question: “would the military defect? Or,
more specifically, would the military shoot the protesters or not?”28

First, fiscal health is essential to the robustness of the coercive apparatus that requires a
constant stream of funds to pay and arm its members.29 When the regime lacks financial
resources, the security forces will no longer be able to pay its recruits thus risking defection and
ultimately crumbling the structure of the coercive apparatus from within. Hence, the availability
of continuous material incentive to security forces and the military is essential in not only arming
them, but also ensuring their willingness to take orders ultimately ensuring regime survival.
Despite the economic turmoil in the region the majority of states, as distinct from many Sub-
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Saharan African regimes, possesses access to a steady revenue through a form of rent income
that is sufficient for military/security related spending. In fact, in 2000, 6.7% of the GNP of
various Middle Eastern states was spent on defense compared to the global average of 3.8% and
2.2% in NATO countries at the time30, the region is additionally home to the highest spenders on
arms globally such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, Egypt, UAE, Kuwait and Algeria, all of whom
accounted for 40% of the global arms sales in the year 200031. The Middle East & North Africa
(5.4%) as a region continue to maintain a military expenditure (% of GDP) that is significantly
higher than the world average (2.2%) in 2019, based on most recent data made available from the
World Bank32. In addition, as of 2019, five of the top ten countries with the highest military
spending’s as part of % of GDP are Arab authoritarian states located in the Middle East such as
Oman (8.8%), Saudi Arabia (8.0%), and Jordan (4.7%)33.

As mentioned earlier, such authoritarian states are able to fund their coercive apparatus
through access to rentier income, either in the form of hydrocarbon exports (e.g., nearly 30
billion dollars in revenue for the Saudi state), or through foreign aid (e.g., Egypt receives aid
from the United States amounting to 2 billion dollars annually). This allows such states to
maneuver away from domestic economic turmoil and poor overall fiscal conditions by spending
rent income on the state prioritizing defense and security at the expense of education, health,
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employment and infrastructure. For instance, according to IMF, despite facing an economic
crisis that forced the Egyptian regime to reduce the subsidy of basic products, its military and
defense expenditure increased significantly 34.
The coercive apparatus is additionally heavily reliant on the existence and preservation of
webs of international support with the important exception of Iran that has been subjected to
crippling sanctions since the withdrawal of the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action under the Trump administration. The regimes would be unable to sustain their fiscal
capacity to maintain such an apparatus in cases of foreign support withdrawal35. Authoritarian
regimes that maintain a robust coercive apparatus rely on foreign aid and patronage in order to
secure the necessary funds and armaments for their various security forces and military. Given
the geopolitical significance of the Middle East, leaders of the various authoritarian states have

historically enjoyed copious amounts of aid and patronage from both western and eastern powers
during the cold war in exchange for promises on deterring or facilitating communism in the
region. Foreign aid continued to pour into the region despite the end of the Cold War, given the
Middle East’s geographic positioning (serving as the link of trade between Asia and Europe) and
access to natural resources. Hence, western policy makers provide fiscal and military support to
various authoritarian regime in order to secure their own interests, including maintaining a
constant supply of oil to the global market and for security purposes in terms of containing the
rise of Islamist regimes.
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Another variable relating to the robustness of the coercive apparatus is the degree of
institutionalization present in the apparatus, this refers to the presence of career advancements
and promotions based on performance and skill, signifying that the institutionalized coercive
apparatus has a merit-based hierarchy36. However, scholars such as Scharpf and Glaßel disagree
with this notion by asserting that the structure of the coercive apparatus specifically the secret
police is designed to be dominated by ‘underachievers’37, the tradeoff for the low skill offered by
such underachieving recruits is unconditional loyalty for the regime fueled by ambition, as such
recruits under the threat of discharge and career pressures are forced to continuously demonstrate
their value to their superiors with hopes of surpassing their competitors for higher positions
within the hierarchy. Consequently, the regime exploits such ambitions to generate regime
loyalty and recruit zealots within their coercive apparatus. Alternatively, a patrimonial driven

coercive apparatus is said to be organized based on cronyism, the hierarchy and advancement
within such a system is plagued and influenced by nepotism, corruption and politics rather than
merit and the rule of law. In addition, the private and public goals are often blurred leading to the
abuse of power and wide spread corruption38 for the sake of personal gain. A coercive apparatus
organized along patrimonial lines and exhibiting low levels of institutionalization is said to be
less receptive to political reform and is closely tied to the status quo and identity of the regime in
power, thus operating in a manner that ensures regime survival and authoritarian resilience.
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This is a consequence of patrimonial organization that can be defined as a system where
“the ruler exerts power on the basis of kin ties, patron-client relations, personal allegiances, and
combinations thereof, with few formal rules and regulations”39. Such an organization blurs the
distinction between the institutional identity of the coercive apparatus and authoritarian regime
that it serves. The regime reinforces patrimonialism through mainly patronage and the creation of
a loyal base. For instance, the head of an authoritarian regime may select senior positions within
his coercive apparatus based on ethnic or sectarian lines. Hafez Assad filled key positions within
his coercive apparatus with members of the Alawite group or members of his inner circle40.
Nearly all director positions within the different intelligence agencies relating to the Syrian
coercive apparatus have been loyal Alawite supporters of Assad, such as Mohammed Nasif
Kheirbek, a member of an Alawite clan closely affiliated with the Assads41.

On the other hand, an institutionalized coercive apparatus could develop an identity and
path that is distinct and does not necessarily overlap with that of the regime, hence officers can
view themselves as separate from the state. Therefore, an institutionalized coercive apparatus
will be more likely to be tolerant and receptive of reforms42, given the risk of jeopardizing the
institutional integrity of the system as a result of divisions within the elite generated from an old
and stagnant regime. Ironically, it can be argued that an institutionalized coercive apparatus
resulted in the demise of Mubarak’s regime given the certain degree of institutionalization
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maintained in the Egyptian Armed Forces that is a byproduct of Egypt’s historical experiences
with state building under Muhammad Ali and Ottoman administration during the 19th century.
Consequently, the military evolved as a unique entity and institution whose identity is divorced
from that of that of the autocrat such as Mubarak, thus resulting in the failure of the Egyptian
armed forces from intervening and suppressing the Egyptian revolution against Mubarak’s
regime.
Based on this discussion, it can be anticipated that repression is central to the survival of
the Syrian regime. This was evident during the reign of Hafez Al Assad where the Syrian Army
and security forces besieged the town of Hama and were deployed to brutally crush a series of
uprisings instigated by the Muslim Brotherhood resulting in thousands of civilian casualties in
what is known as the Hama Massacre of 1982. In recent times, most notably following the onset

of Arab uprisings in 2011 the Syrian regime has demonstrated its unrestricted capacity and will
in brutally repressing all forms of opposition including detainments, tortures, murders,
indiscriminate shelling of towns and the use of chemical warfare. Contrarily, while the Jordanian
regime employs repression as a means of regime stability its scope, capacity, and will is dwarfed
by that of the Syrian regime as repression levels displayed by the Jordanian regime are moderate
and limited to intimidation tactics, censorship and occasional detainment of political opposition.
Hence, it is anticipated that repression although contributing to the resilience of the Jordanian
regime, its function in regime stability is not as crucial as it is in the case of Syria.
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Cooptation
Johannes Gerschewski defines cooptation “as the capacity to tie strategically-relevant
actors (or a group of actors) to the regime elite”43, essentially forging an alliance on the intraelite level involving elites from various backgrounds such as the industrial or business and
military with that of regime/political elites, thus serving the function of maintaining elite

cohesion and the regulatory capacity of the political elite. Alternatively, cooptation can be
extended to involve the masses thus form a strategic bond between the ruler and the ruled, this
can be observed in the Arab oil rentier states as investigated by Beblawi in “The Rentier State in
the Arab World” where the state occupies the role of as a provider of private favors through the
ruler’s benevolence”44. As a result, the interests of the masses encompassed in the form of no
taxation and welfare benefits is enmeshed in the interests and ultimately survival of the regime
that serves as the benefactors. Hence, such a bond linking the rulers with the ruled generate a
feature of ‘no taxation thus no representation’ as the public is essentially politically kept passive,
isolated, and prevented from the process of governance, in exchange for a variety of tangible
benefits.
The function of cooptation is instrumental as it serves as a form of balancing mechanism
that checks the power of nonpolitical elites, it ensures that the power of non-political elites does
not obstruct that of the political elite, and that elites operate specifically concerning the use of
their resources in a manner that is in line with that of the political elite. Preventing nonpolitical
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elite actors from accumulating too much power that may potentially jeopardize the status quo of
the political elite is also essential to authoritarian resiliency. Nonetheless, this threat is not
necessarily exclusive to non-political elites as members of the same ruling elite coalition may
attempt to expand the limits of their power at the expense of other members, thus resulting in
what has been termed as elite factionalism.
Elite factionalism that often threatens the stability of authoritarian regimes has been
investigated extensively by Svolik who writes, “the dictator may acquire more power at the
expense of the ruling coalition, which may attempt to deter such opportunism by threatening to
stage a coup”45. Subsequently, two forms of authoritarian regimes are produced: contested and
established dictatorships. The former is a form of regime defined by a “power struggle between
the dictator and the ruling coalition and coups occur frequently”46. The latter form is a more

stable regime where the authority of the dictator is uncontested by the ruling coalition. In that
case, coup attempts will ultimately be futile. An established dictator can only be removed
through factors exogenous to the regime, such as popular uprising or foreign intervention.
Cooptation has served as one of the essential mechanisms for the regime survival of the
Assad’s in Syria, specifically elite cooptation as examined by Stacher who proposed that “the
ruling coalition’s senior elites are the central agents for maintaining a political system”47. During
his reign, Hafiz Assad incorporated elements of the elites and state organizations into his regime,
rather than isolate them in order to ensure long term stability. Senior officials and members from
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various state institutions including the military, security forces and the Ba’athist party for
instance were frequently consulted by Assad in policy formulation, thus Assad did not place
himself above other elites, instead forming a coalition where they form a pillar of the Assad
regime. This mirrors Stacher’s proposition where “elites are structurally positioned near the
epicenter of governance”48 given their capacity to preserve or challenge the status quo.
Henceforth Assad has formed an elite coalition that placed various elites near the
epicenter of political power in Syria. This system allowed for cementing the identity and
interests of the elite into Assad’s regime, thus absorbing them into the status quo and preventing
internal sources of opposition that might undermine the structure of authority in the regime and
challenge Assad’s power. Consequently, contributing to regime resiliency even after the passing
of Hafez Assad, whereby the elite coalition stepped in and orchestrated the succession of his son

Bashar Assad49. This further demonstrates that Assad’s regime fits into the established dictator
archetype as discussed by Svolik, the inclusion of various elites into Assad’s regime and their
placement near the epicenter of governance corelated the stability and longevity of Assad’s
regime with that of the elites, as they may experience a loss in power or wealth should the status
quo be shifted. The position of elites and their power was interwoven with the Assad regime as
they were granted pivotal roles in the coalition that ruled Syria, hence the coalition including the
elites and different elements of state institutions organized the succession of Hafiz Assad’s son
Bashar Assad into power following his death, as a means of preserving the status quo and the
coalitions position as well as power in Syria.

48

Ibid., 79.
Stacher, J. (2012). Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria. Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern
and Islamic Societies and Cultures, Stanford University Press. (p.87)
49

26

Hence, it can be anticipated that cooptation is vital to the propagation of authoritarian
rule in both the Syrian and Jordanian regimes, thus contributing to their resiliency to similar
extents. In Syria, Hafez Al-Assads cooptation strategies characterized by an ethnic dimension
where he placed members of the same ethnic group he affiliates with, the Alawites, in positions
near the epicenter of governance minimized internal dissent among elites, thus contributing to his
survival and the dynastic succession of his son Bashar following his death. In Jordan, the very
foundation of Hashemite rule since its genesis was based on a contract and subsequent alliance
between the powerful tribes of then Transjordan and the Hashemites, this alliance was the key to
Hashemite dynastic survival in the past decades as it faced a series of existential threats.
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RESEARCH DESIGN

As mentioned earlier briefly in the introduction, the research question I aim to explore in
my thesis is: “What factors contribute to the resilience of authoritarianism across different types
of regimes in the Middle East?” The main focus of this study is to investigate the resiliency of
various authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. To accomplish this, I will compare two Middle
Eastern regimes characterized by an authoritarian framework, yet differ in type of regime, more
specifically, monarchical or republican rule. My first case is the Hashemite regime in Jordan,
which represents an authoritarian regime characterized by monarchical rule specifically of the
linchpin archetype. My second case is the Assad regime in Syria, representing an authoritarian
regime classified by republican rule. Both regimes have survived thus far, hence exhibiting

authoritarian resilience.
These regimes are fundamentally different and have faced drastically different outcomes
following the Arab Spring; Syria plunged into a full scale total civil war, while Jordan avoided
violence through concessions at the behest of the monarchy such as the implementation of a new
constitution containing 42 constitutional amendments that in essence would curtail some of the
king’s power while promising to expand the public political sphere50. Nonetheless, both the
Syrian and Jordanian regimes have exhibited authoritarian resilience through the survival of their
regimes thus far, hence I am to conceptualize authoritarian resilience and indicate it through
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dynastic survival, specifically the perpetuation of the Hashemite rule in Jordan and the Assad
rule in Syria.
I aim to identify both similar and different factors that have contributed to the endurance
of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan and the Assad regime in Syria over the past several
decades using a tripartite conceptual framework of legitimation, cooptation and repression.
Methods employed to sustain authoritarian rule that is common to both dynasties include the
monopolization over the state’s coercive apparatus entailing intelligence agencies, security
forces and the military, the formation of cross-societal alliances that is dominated by the ruling
dynasty, and the formation of external alliances with regional and global powers in order to
secure resources, specifically finances to overcome periods of economic hardship that run the
risk of triggering political turmoil. Moreover, differences across both regimes must be taken into

consideration to provide an additional lens into the regional persistence of authoritarianism, such
as population size and ethnic-sectarian composition, legitimacy claims and the nature of foreign
alliances.
Evidence employed in this thesis will be extracted from a comprehensive literature
review consisting of peer reviewed academic journals, books and articles relating to
authoritarianism in the Middle East. Various news articles both in English and Arabic from
different media outlets local, international and state-owned will be additionally used to
supplement the thesis. Furthermore, I aim to extract data first hand from sources such as
speeches, publications from state-owned media, social media accounts owned or sponsored by
each of the Syrian and Jordanian regimes, as well as opposition pages and accounts in order to
measure the degree of legitimation, repression, and cooptation as part of the grander
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authoritarian framework present in both the Syrian and Jordanian regime. For instance, I will
analyze the contents of speeches and articles published by each regime to derive the image and
legitimacy claims presented by the regime itself.
As for repression data will be gathered through reports from various sources including
human rights organizations as well as journalistic news reporting from local and international
media outlets detailing the detainment, harassment, torture and overall use or threat of use of
coercion by the Syrian and Jordanian regimes on their subjects respectively. In Syria, numerous
detailed accounts of human rights violations, persecution and repression of Syrians demonstrate
the brutal repression of the regime. In Jordan, the regime does not rely on repression to the same
extent as the Syrian regime. However, it should be also kept in mind that Syria witnessed mass
scale popular protests that called for the end of the regime, Jordan’s experience with the mass

uprisings was limited to small-scale anti-government protests that initially called for reform
rather than regime change.
For cooptation data will be gathered to investigate the nature of coalitions formed by both
the Syrian and Jordanian regimes, their composition and role will be examined in order to
conclude whether they contributed to regime resiliency or posed a challenge to the status quo
through coup attempts. Cooptation was instrumental in the survival of the Assad regime since its
genesis. Hafez Al Assad incorporated a coalition of various elites ranging from state institutions,
the military and the Ba’athist party into his regime that encompassed a role of policy formulation
and serving as aides to Hafiz Al Assad. This allowed the Assad regime to maintain a robust
internal structure that was virtually void of internal opposition emanating from the elite.
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Similarly, cooptation is vital to the propagation of Hashemite rule in Jordan, specifically
the coalition of East Bankers. The Hashemites have long relied on East Bankers consisting of
indigenous tribesmen that predominantly inhabit the southern provinces of Jordan as their main
pillar of support for their rule, in exchange the Hashemites would guarantee to protect the
interests of the East Bankers in terms of providing employment opportunities within the public
sector, and enabling them to dominate senior positions in the government as well as the regime’s
coercive apparatus. Consequently, a system built on “wasta” (connections) was born that favored
the East Bankers while discriminating against Jordanians of Palestinian origins.
The thesis will utilize data to evaluate the claims set forth by previous scholars
concerning the survival of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East within the framework of
repression, legitimation and cooptation. However, the thesis aims to additionally explore the role

of other potential factors that have not received as much scholarly attention such as population
size, ethnic composition, geographic location, external alliances and nature of economies, in
contributing or undermining resiliency of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.
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EMPIRICAL DISCUSSION

Legitimation
Legitimation is employed by the Hashemite regime as a central pillar of stability and
mechanism for survival in Jordan. This is mainly derived from ancestry claims set forth by the
regime linking the Hashemite ruling dynasty to Prophet Muhammad, hence granting the
Hashemites a special right to govern under Islamic law and tradition. Such religious allusions are
instrumental in consolidating power in a region like the Middle East that holds tradition and
religion as supreme values that guide many aspects of daily life both in the past and present, thus
when the Hashemites claim descendancy from the most historically, religiously and culturally
significant figure in the Middle East they are afforded a competitive advantage for political

power over all other tribes and dynasties that is unparalleled in the region. The Saud dynasty for
instance despite its political significance and power in the region fails to replicate the legitimacy
claims enjoyed by the Hashemites as they do not possess similar direct genealogical links to the
Prophet Muhammad, this has historically fueled the rivalry between the Hashemites and Sauds.
Consequently, legitimation continues to serve as a powerful tool in the survival of the
Jordanian regime as the monarch continually reminds his population of the special religious titles

and genealogical links of the Hashemites to Prophet Muhammad, specifically given the highly
religious and conservative nature of Jordanian society. This is evident in the opening remarks of
national speeches addressed by the monarch that entail the traditional prayer to Prophet
Muhammad with a Hashemite twist, emphasizing the claimed Hashemite identity of the Prophet.
For instance, this reference can be clearly highlighted in the opening of King Abdullah II’s
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speech in the opening of the 19th Parliament’s Non-ordinary Session in 2020 “In the name of
Allah the merciful, as well as prayers and peace to our Master Muhammad, the Arab Hashemite
Prophet”51.
As mentioned earlier the symbolic and assumed custodian roles of the Hashemite
Dynasty are essential elements in the legitimation of their rule and regime image in Jordan, the
Middle East and the broader Muslim world. The monarch continuously places emphasis on the
Hashemite custodianship over Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem domestically and
abroad. This is facilitated through speeches addressed by the monarch himself or through the
dispersal of propaganda material scattered across the kingdom. For instance, a billboard placed
in one of the busiest traffic routes in the capital city Amman that depicts an image of Al-Aqsa
Mosque with the caption that reads “Jerusalem is Arabic and its custodianship is Hashemite” ,

the billboard additionally depicts an image of a heart joined by both the Palestinian and
Jordanian flags with a caption that reads “One Heart” symbolizing the unity between the ethnic
Palestinian (West Bankers) and ethnic Jordanian (East Bankers) populations of Jordan (See
Figure 1). This billboard is an example of a propaganda campaign initiated by the regime to
reinforce its legitimacy concerning its role in protecting holy sites in Jerusalem. This role was
put in jeopardy during the Israeli-Palestinian crisis in May 2021 that involved explicit attacks
and raids on Al Aqsa Mosque by Israeli security forces and settlers. The crisis immediately
fueled public outroar in Jordan that included largely unorganized demonstrations and criticism of
the regime’s handling of the situation. Protestors were critical of the fact that Jordan only
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extended verbal condemnation of the Israeli government and failed to meet popular demand
(given nationwide demonstrations such as those in front of the Israeli embassy calling for the
cancellation of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel known as the Wadi Araba
Agreements, as well as revoking the recent gas deal), that at the minimum included the expulsion
of the Israeli Ambassador and closure of the Israeli embassy in Amman. Hence, the regime was
prompted in dispersing propaganda elements such as the billboard mentioned earlier as a public
image repair campaign.

Figure 1: The Al-Aqsa Billboard in Amman
Source: Author’s photo
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In addition, references of allusions to the religious and cultural significance of the
Hashemite dynasty are embedded deep in national symbols and imagery such as the national
anthem that contains the lyrics “O King of the Arabs, you share the goodness of the Prophet,
Honor in lineage,”52 , this alludes to the claimed descendance of the Hashemites and
genealogical links to Prophet Muhammad. Such claims are integral to the Hashemites claim to
the throne and legitimacy both domestically and regionally, this is evident in the founding of the
modern Jordanian state following the declaration of Transjordan from the British and the
crowning of King Abdullah I as its king in 1946, where ancestry claims to Prophet Muhammad
were widely accepted by the local tribal population (East Bankers) that received the Hashemites
and were perceived as a sufficient reason for the Hashemite ascension to the throne53 despite the
fact the Hashemite dynasty was not native to the territories of Jordan rather originating in Hijaz.

Tribal acceptance of Hashemite rule is additionally highlighted in the events following the
expulsion of Glubb in 1956 and the subsequent Arabization of the Jordanian Armed Forces that
were largely Bedouin and displayed immediate loyalty to King Hussein54.
Nevertheless, as the tribal nature of the Jordanian population began to shift following
waves of mass migration of Palestinian refugees into Jordan in the after math of the Arab Israeli
Wars in 1948 and 1967, legitimacy claims of the Hashemites began to be challenged specifically
by the Jordanian populace that originated from the West Bank. This was evident following the
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merging of the West Bank and Transjordan under Hashemite authority that was repeatedly
challenged by powerful Palestinian forces such as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem at the time, AlHaj Amin Al-Hussayni whose supporters opposed Hashemite authority and accused the monarch
of betrayal over ‘his pro-British policy and talks with Tel Aviv’55. In addition, it must be noted
that Hashemite authority was further challenged recently by prominent tribal figures in the
traditionally loyal tribal base of the Hashemite regime following liberalizing economic policies
adopted in the reign of King Abdullah II that resulted in economic grievances among the East
Banker population, such sentiments were further catalyzed and emboldened following the events
of the Arab Spring. Ahmad Abbadi is a tribal leader, former MP and a prominent anti-monarchist
who publicly challenges Hashemite authority and claims that the territories of Jordan rightfully
belong to its local tribes based on a British agreement in 1917 that divided the Jordanian

territories among local tribes. Abbadi claims that the Hashemites unlawfully confiscated tribal
lands through the state that they run and repopulated them with refugees in recent years, while
noting that ‘In Jordan the tribes have the legality and power, the others are employees that take
their power and legality from the state’56.
The Jordanian regime additionally relies on social media to bolster its image and as a
means of legitimizing the regime through the lens of fabricated or at least highly exaggerated
popular support and patriotism. As mentioned earlier in the literature review, social media
accounts exist in Instagram that are aimed at glorifying the Hashemite dynasty and its rule in
Jordan under the guise of hyper nationalism and patriotism. While such accounts maintain no
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official ties to the regime in the eyes of the public, their activity is suspicious in that it seems to
remit regime propaganda synchronously with official state-owned media channels, thus implying
that such social media accounts are entirely state-owned or its operators are paid off by the
regime. An example of such suspiciously hyper-nationalist social media pages is a public
Instagram page titled @1946hkj that is littered with thousands of regime propaganda posts, and
has a following of 117,000 individuals. The description of the bio of the page highlights an
extreme form of nationalism that places national and regime interests above all, as it states “And
in our love for Jordan, we are not neutral, but fanatical to death, and we do not compromise on
Jordan, because its interest is above everything.”57 This page is dedicated to spreading content
that promotes loyalty and pride in the Jordanian royal family, military and security forces as their
identity is intertwined with the monarch, who according to the operators of the page forms an

integral and perhaps the only component of the conception of a nation and national identity.
The exaggeration of the page’s loyalty towards the regime stems not only from its near
synchronous publishing of propaganda content as official regime sources, but also from its
demonstrated capacity in defending the regime and monarch, specifically in domestically
turbulent times such as the attempted coup allegedly spearheaded by the king’s half-brother
Hamza in April 2021. Immediately after news of the failed coup broke out, the page titled
1946hkj published a series of posts that depicted their unconditional support for the monarch
while calling out those “feeding into the chorus of sedition by lying while being aware of their
lies in order to escalate the situation”58 . An example of such posts published on April 3rd depicts
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an image of King Abdullah II with a hashtag “this nation will stand” and a caption that reads “we
are with you our Master/Sir”. Another post depicting an image of the monarch entails a caption
that reads “March for we stand with you and behind you, march for the eye of God will protect
you, march in the scale of your pride in us, we love you Sir, and took pride in you in front of the
world, and showed you off as the rightful King and Leader”59 , the exaggerated vocabulary
utilized in the vivid descriptions of loyalty in the captions of the posts published by the
Instagram page 1946hkj illustrate the artificial nature of the page, thus suggesting that it is either
state owned and operated by regime elements or its operators are paid off by the regime to
publish regime propaganda. This is further evident given that the nature of comments posted
under the posts of @1946 is in unison in that it amplifies the glorification of the regime and the
royal family, for there are no comments that exist formulating critical voices calling out the

propaganda messages shared by the page or expressing criticism over the monarchy. It is highly
likely that such comments would get deleted as a means of censoring critical voices online and
dissent. For instance, during the events of the alleged coup attempt against King Abdullah II
earlier this year, nearly all posts posted under the page @1946hkj expressing support for the king
and calling out those fomenting chaos were disabled. In fact, a greater degree of variety exists in
similar posts concerning the regime and monarch under the social media accounts of non-stateowned local media channels such as @royanews, where comments forming critical voices and
can be labeled as anti-monarchist can be found under various posts.
Religious and cultural elements are absent in the legitimation of the Syrian regime at least
in a scale that mirrors that employed by the Jordanian regime. The Assad regime mainly relies on

59

https://www.instagram.com/p/CNjSsOHhN9C/

38

a cult of personality to fuel its legitimacy that is facilitated through the dissemination of
symbolic and rhetorical elements that ensure the hyper-glorification of Assad, thus fabricating a
seemingly omniscient presence of Assad in all aspects of Syrian society. Such elements and
exaggerated symbolism are evident in the regime’s Instagram account titled @syrianpresidency60
that was launched in 2013 as part of an effort to promote Assads regime and rehabilitate its
domestic, regional and global image following the domestic turmoil that quickly evolved into a
full-scale civil war in Syria. The account maintains a sizeable following of 166,000 and contains
over a thousand posts depicting Bashar Assad and other regime figures such as his wife Asma in
imagery comforting wounded soldiers, families and civilians or walking amongst a large crowd
of seemingly adoring civilians in rural villages, as depicted by a post that showcases Bashar AlAssad walking in the midst of crowds of residents while inquiring about the damages to their

state of living following forest fires in the villages of “Mashta Al Hilu”61 . One post in particular
highlights the exaggerated symbolism employed by the regime for the purposes of legitimation,
the post in question depicts an image of Assad’s wife, Asma Al Assad with an excessively long
and descriptive caption published on Mother’s Day 2021 that celebrates Syria as a mother62 . It
seems that the symbolism paints Asma Al Assad as ‘the mother’ of Syria expressing her grief
over the war and recognition of the efforts and the resilience of the Syrian mothers collective in
their bravery, and commitment to raising the future generation of Syria in the harsh conditions of
war.
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The overwhelming majority of online engagement in the posts posted by the page
@syrianpresidency glorify Assad and display messages of support from both real and fake
accounts. However, comments can be found criticizing Assad and calling out his regime for its
brutality in recent decades that have not yet been censored or deleted, for instance one user
named @elifhanna commented “How about those mothers who were forced to abandon their
homeland because of your husband’s brutality against his own citizens? Life is so unfair and
reality is so terrifying”63 under the Mother’s Day post mentioned earlier. Another user
@ali_toma98 commented “he slaughtered half his people while displacing the other half, and he
disfigured his nation that was God’s paradise on Earth and after all that he’s now talking against
terrorism…”64 on a video posted by the page depicting Assad giving out a speech in a mosque
discussing religious extremism in the region, and how it was exploited by Western powers to

breed regional chaos and instability to suit their agendas.
The Assad regime also boasts the high re-election rate of Bashar Al-Assad who was
reelected in June 2021. It instrumentalizes grand re-election oath ceremonies that involve the
swearing in of Assad for another term and a national address broadcast nationally and abroad for
the purposes of legitimizing Assad’s ‘re-election’ and the continuous propagation of his rule. In
the most recent oath ceremony, regime figures and loyalist occupy large halls while chanting and
celebrating Assad for his reelection as a sign of popular support. In one instance a man stands up
and interrupts the ceremony in order to recite a poem written specifically for Assad, recognizing
his bravery and victory in the civil war while calling him ‘our true and only leader, the son of
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Hafez’65 .This practice of legitimation mirrors that in actual democracies that operate on popular
sovereignty, the difference in the case of Syria is that principle of popular sovereignty is absent
in the process of governance, and the regime fabricates as well as manipulates election results
while making no attempt in presenting such elections as free and fair. In fact, documentation
reveals that regime loyalists have voted more than once, and official regime results illustrate that
in some cases the number of votes for Assad exceed the number of residents in areas controlled
by the regime66 . Given widespread fraudulent practices, Assad was reelected with 95% of the
vote67.
The Assad regime has been documented in pursuing campaigns bolstering Bashar
Assad’s image from a religious lens in order to appeal and appease the Sunni religious majority
of the Syrian population. For instance, depicting Assad as a pious Muslim that frequently attends

prayers at mosques during religious holidays while attending discussions with religious figures
broadcasted on national TV that condemn terrorism and religious extremism/sectarianism.
Evidence of such activities are littered across the Syrian regime’s Instagram page mentioned
earlier @syrianpresidency such as a post depicting Assad performing prayers in the Grand
Umayyad Mosque in Damascus celebrating Eid Al Fitr68. Another post depicts Assad performing
the prayers in the Sa’ad bin Muath mosque in Damascus with a caption reading “President Assad
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participates in the religious celebration of the anniversary of Prophet Muhammad’s birth”69.
Such posts are an effort by the regime to depict Bashar Assad as a ‘good Muslim’ who practices
the faith of the Sunni population majority despite belonging to the ethnic-religious minority of
the Alawites, this is a strategy adopted by the regime aimed as a means of legitimizing Assad’s
regime in Syrian society.

Repression
Despite the image the Jordanian regime broadcasts as being a beacon of liberalism and
progressive in a hostile region plagued by repressive authoritarian rule, in order to appease its
Western benefactors, the Jordanian regime at its core is authoritarian that regularly employs

repression as an instrument to preserve the monarchial power. Evidence of the use of repression
by the Jordanian regime to quell opposition to maintain dynastic survival of the Hashemites can
be traced to the reign of King Hussein Bin Talal in the period following the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War, King Hussein shifted his policies from concessions to repression of the PLO that at the time
posed a direct threat to Hashemite sovereignty and his survival through the Palestinian militia’s
establishment of a de facto ‘state within a state’. This ultimately led to a brutal military
crackdown by Jordanian armed forces on the PLO presence that entailed shelling of Palestinian
refugee camps housing PLO members, expulsion of Palestinian refugees, and campaigns purging
the public sector from the PLO and Palestinians all together, resulting in thousands of casualties
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in a period known as Black September (1970-1971)70. The Jordanian regime continues to
implement repression in recent times under King Abdullah II specifically following the events of
the Arab Uprisings in 2011 that posed potential direct threats to his regime survival.
In Jordan, the regime did not face an existential crisis as mass popular and social
mobilization failed to materialize at least on a scale mirroring to that of neighboring countries
such as Egypt or Syria. Jordan did witness a wave of small anti- government demonstrations
during the onset of the Arab uprisings that continued to gain momentum despite concessions
from the regime to welcome “democratic reforms” based on protestors demands. Initially the
regime utilized coercion to repress demonstrators through its repressive apparatus, however once
the street level repressive activity became publicized among international media outlets the
image conscious regime, which has a staunchly pro-Western orientation, was forced to improvise

its means of quelling dissent with constrained repression. For instance, the regime implemented
covert means of repression to cover the tracks of its repressive apparatus such as deploying non
uniformed regime agents and sympathizers that “engaged in sabotage, setting fires and attacking
people on the streets”71. Moreover, the regime resorted to legalistic channels to dilute the nature
of its repressive activities against any form of dissent under a vaguely defined provision relating
to anti-terrorism, “The anti-terrorism law allows the repression apparatus, composed of the
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country’s intelligence agency and the State Security Court (SSC), to suppress any dissenting
voice by means of systematic judicial harassment and torture.”72
The utility of repression by the Jordanian regime has evolved and expanded following the
events of the Arab Spring that generated immense political, social, and economic turmoil in the
Middle East that continues to echo today, thus posing continuous threats to the Jordanian regime
that is struggling to cope with an increasingly worsening socio-economic landscape compounded
by the COVID-19 pandemic. This is evident in the regime’s handling of the nationwide protests
of teachers orchestrated by the Teachers’ Syndicate demanding salary raises, the regime
responded by deploying undercover public security forces to peaceful teacher protests to detain
protesters, and the police to arrest lawful members of the Teachers’ Syndicate73. On July 25th
2020, the Prosecutor General of Amman ordered the arrest of all 13 members of the Teachers

Syndicate executive board that resulted in police raids of the syndicate’s headquarters in Amman
and closure of all its branches in the kingdom, the order additionally entailed ceasing the
operations of the syndicate for 2 years74. The following measure was extrajudicial and a breach
of Jordanian rule of law as the attorney general does not possess the power to issue the closure as
described by Human Rights Watch that labeled the legal grounds for such procedures as
‘dubious’75. Authorities were additionally reported to have arrested over 250 individuals from
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the protests by August 2020 and “forced detainees to sign pledges promising to refrain from
future demonstrations to secure their release”76. Global reaction to such events was limited to
condemnations issued by the UN and human rights organizations such as HRW, western
governments that consider Jordan a close ally failed to comment or condemn the authoritarian
activities of the government highlighted by the events of the Teachers’ Syndicate protests.
Furthermore, the Jordanian regime has increasingly engaged in campaigns of crackdown
on dissent expressed on social media through censorship and arrests. In April of 2020, authorities
arrested Roya TV’s General Manager Fares Sayegh and News Director Mohammad Alkhalidi
following a news report published by Roya news on its website and social media that displayed a
video depicting interviewed locals expressing their resentment and grievances of the economic
fallout induced by the government’s harsh lockdown that began in March 202077. Both Sayegh

and Alkhalidi were referred to the military court of national security and charged under the AntiTerrorism Law. However, they were released on bail 3 days later and prompted the media outlet
Roya to issue an apology for publishing sensitive materials that defied government orders
concerning the pandemic while renewing "the executive boards trust and faith in the Jordanian
state under the leadership of King Abdullah II in preserving national security"78. Another
instance of media censorship and persecution of journalists involves the arrest of cartoonist
Emad Hajjaj after publishing a political cartoon criticizing the normalization of ties between
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Israel and the UAE under Mohammed bin Zayed, and the subsequent Israeli efforts in blocking
the UAE’s purchase of F-35 fighter jets from the US (See figure 2). Hajjaj was referred to the
State Security Court and was briefly charged with ‘disturbing Jordan’s relations with a foreign
state’79 under the Anti-Terrorism Law in August 2020, until he was released shortly after his
arrest where prosecutors dropped his charges and converted them to defamation under
Cybersecurity Law that would be handled by a civilian court80.

Figure 2: Emad Hajjaj’s cartoon titled “Bin Zayed & Israel”
Source: “Bin Zayed & Israel” “”بن زايد وإسرائيل. Hajjaj Cartoons.

While the repression exhibited by the Jordanian regime can be classified as low intensity,

its capacity has noticeably expanded in recent years hinting at a decrease in tolerance of dissent
by the regime. This is evident in increased censorship and monitoring of online activity by
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security forces, the frequency at which voices of opposition are either suppressed or prosecuted
has increased dramatically over recent years. This form of repressive activity has expanded to all
segments of society including elite tribal figures and members of the royal family. In fact, the
repressive capacity of the Jordanian regime seems to extend its borders by silencing critics and
dissidents based abroad such as Jordanian activist Ahmad El Otoum based in the UAE, that was
detained by Emirati authorities in late 2020 and sentenced to 10 years in prison for using social
media to criticize the Jordanian government, king and royal family.81
In addition, the Jordanian regime has been reported to utilize its coercive apparatus to
crush dissent across all levels of society. This has been especially evident in recent news where
the king employed the coercive apparatus to stifle dissent within his own family and the political
elite that were once thought to be above the law and untouchable, resulting in the house arrest of

the king’s half-brother and former crown prince Hamza bin Hussein, as well as the detainment of
other senior political figures.82 The ‘Sedition Trial’ highlighted the use of the regime’s vaguely
defined anti-terrorism laws used to suppress dissenting voices, Bassem Awdalla a former advisor
to King Abdullah II and a low ranking royal family named Sharif Hassan bin Zaid were charged
with sedition, inciting opposition to the regime, and engaging in activities jeopardizing national
security83. Both defendants were charged with a sentence of 15 years in prison. The severity of
the expanding repressive capacity of the Jordanian regime has been publicly recognized and
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criticized by former crown prince Hamza bin Hussein in a video he published under house arrest
in the immediate aftermath of the regime’s crackdown on elite dissent, “Even to criticize a small
aspect leads to arrests, and abuse by the security services”84.
The coercive apparatus is the primary mechanism for repression in Jordan that is directly
funded and maintained by foreign aid. The Hashemite regime in Jordan has long been a recipient
of foreign aid that it relies on to barely stay afloat economically despite harsh conditions, as well
as to fund its coercive apparatus. The Hashemite regime has been receiving crucial foreign aid
for decades since the onset of the Cold War, where the United States has granted the regime 1.4
billion USD in the period from 1957-1980.85 However, it was not until 1994 when Jordan has
embraced the full grace and generosity of foreign aid from western powers. Following Jordan’s
signing of the peace treaty with Israel, the United States immediately increased economic aid to

the monarchy from 50 million USD prior to the peace treaty in 1993 to almost 220 million USD
by 1999. The European Union also poured multilateral aid into Jordan in 1995, in the form of
approved loans and grants valued up to 550 million euros86.
The regime in Jordan is favored by the West for its pro-Western orientation. This is
specifically highlighted by the bilateral relation between the United States and Jordan, where
Washington quickly realized Jordan’s would be role in facilitating American geopolitical
projects within the region, thus offering the monarchical regime generous amounts of aid and
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support, whose stability was now viewed as more important than any democratic reforms project.
In the face of the perceived risks of the rise of anti-western and anti-Israeli fundamentalists to
power through democratic channels, generous amounts of material support in the form of
economic assistance and military equipment were employed to fortify a compromised economy
and the regime’s security apparatus. The bilateral relationship between Washington and Amman
continues to blossom resulting in increased economic, military and humanitarian aid, for instance
Jordan is one of the United States’ largest recipients of foreign aid receiving 1.2 billion USD in
2016.87 “The United States is Jordan’s single largest provider of bilateral assistance, providing
more than $1.5 billion in 2019, including $1.082 billion appropriated by the U.S. Congress to
Jordan through USAID in the 2019 fiscal year budget, and $425 million in Foreign Military
Financing”.88

The display of repression by the Syrian regime in the past decade is unparallel to any
other authoritarian regime in the region, given the extent pursued by the regime to crush
opposition and hold onto the reins of power in the onset of a prolonged and complex civil war.
During the onset of the uprisings, the regime immediately resorted to highly repressive channels
facilitated by its repressive apparatus to brutally crush peaceful protests, that involved the
imprisonment, torture, and murder of thousands of protestors. The expansion of the scale of
protests was complimented by an increasingly intense and violent response from the regime,
ultimately the Syrian military was involved and consequently fractured into pro government
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forces and those that defected forming the Syrian Rebel forces.89 As protests continued to amass
against Bashar Assad in 2011, the response of the regime’s coercive apparatus was brutally
repressive and continued to amplify regardless of costs, this is highlighted by security forces
imprisoning, torturing and murdering thousands of protestors, not to mention unleashing the
Syrian military against its own people resulting in massacres90. Bashar Assad employed all
methods regardless of the costs to preserve the status quo and thus ensure regime survival, he
even authorized the use of chemical warfare and barrel bombs against his own people in order to
crush the insurgency.91
The degree of repression employed by the Syrian regime can be empirically measured
using its score on the Political Terror Scale that was mentioned earlier, Syria scored a value of 5
indicating extremely high levels of repression. In addition, Syria is currently ranked as the least

free nation-state in the world by Freedom House92. One of the most infamous displays of
repression by the regime that set off the civil, war was the arrest and torture of 15 teenage boys
in the southwestern city of Dera’a, that spray-painted “the people demand the fall of the regime”
on a school wall in the wake of the Arab Spring.93 Further evidence of the severity of repression
utilized by the Syrian regime is displayed behind the scenes in military detention facilities and
prisons littered across the country where severe human rights violations including intense
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beatings, torture, and executions on a mass systematic scale were observed, recorded and leaked
by military defectors. An example of such entails the ‘Caesar photographs’ that depict the
systematic killings and deaths of detainees in regime detention facilities located across
Damascus, over 50,000 images were smuggled out of Syria by a defector codenamed ‘Caesar’
between May 2011 and August 201394 revealing horrifying images of piles of dead bodies of
detained men, women and children that died under the custody of the Syrian regime.
The causes of death for the detainees ranged from starvation to murder by security
officials (gunshot wounds). The majority of the victims photographed were held in 5 different
security branches (Branch 215, Branch 227, Mezze Airport Branch 248, Branch 216, and Branch
238)95 in Damascus, upon death detainees are transported from the branches to morgues in
military hospitals such as 601 Military Hospital. Nonetheless, based on images and the

harrowing remarks of ‘Caesar’ the frequency of deaths in the branches far exceeded the capacity
of morgues in military hospital, hence bodies were stockpiled in the open-air garages of military
hospitals. “We used to use the morgue, but they were bringing way more bodies, so we decided
to start using the garage.”-Caesar.96 The harrowing scenes depicted in the photographs reveal
thousands of bodies with identification numbers mimicking scenes of the Holocaust.
Furthermore, the Syrian regime under Bashar Assad unleashed chemical warfare on its
citizens to crush opposition and for intimidation purposes. The Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapon confirmed 17 instances where chemical weapons were ‘likely or definitely
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used’ out of 77 allegations of chemical attacks engaged by the Syrian government. One of such
instances is the chemical attacks launched on the Ghoutta area of Damascus, on August 21st,
2013 reports and videos began to surface of large numbers of dead animals and people in the
opposition-controlled districts of Eastern and Western Ghoutta. “Victims consistently showed
symptoms including suffocation; constricted, irregular, and infrequent breathing; involuntary
muscle spasms; nausea; frothing at the mouth; fluid coming out of noses and eyes; convulsing;
dizziness; blurred vision; and red and irritated eyes, and pin-point pupils. According to an expert
review of the available evidence, the symptoms exhibited by the victims are consistent with
exposure to a nerve agent such as Sarin”97. The use of chemical agents was confirmed by site
visits, chemical, medical and environmental samples retrieved by a special UN team sent to
investigate the attacks98. Regime involvement in the chemical attacks can be traced to a Human

Rights Watch investigation, where the report highlights the use of a range of Soviet era and
produced surface-to-surface rockets used to deliver chemical agents in the attacks99. Given the
nature and origins of the artillery used to carry the chemical agents unleashed in the attacks on
Ghoutta, it is highly likely that the Syrian regime was the perpetrator.
The Syrian regime’s destructive capacity of repression is further highlighted by its record
of indiscriminate artillery shelling and ‘barrel bombs’ targeting densely populated civilian areas
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such as schools, medical facilities, mosques and essential facilities (water and electric).
According to a UN human rights inquiry into Syria report, 50% of total documented deaths in
2014 were a consequence of aerial strikes, ground shelling and explosions in general100. In 2015,
27,006 civilian deaths were recorded as a result of mortar, artillery, and rocket attacks101, the
main culprit in these casualties are barrel bombs, large containers filled with explosives and in
some cases chemical agents (Ghoutta attack in 2013; barrel bombs filled with chlorine agents
used by the Syrian regime) are dropped from helicopters or planes on rebel-controlled
neighborhoods and other densely populated areas. This is a signature tactic of the Syrian Air
force in order to reduce the cost of bombardment while maintaining a destructive scale, that
results in mass civilian casualties given the indiscriminate nature of their targeting.
The Syrian coercive apparatus mainly the military is financed and supported by foreign

actors such as Russia and Iran, the primary benefactors of the Assad regime. Syria maintains an
extensive history of arms deals with Russia, in fact “according to SIPRI estimates, Russia
supplied Syria with 72 per cent of its arms imports during 2007–2011”102. Russia continues to
supply the Syrian regime with sophisticated weaponry despite the regime lacking the financial
resources to afford paying for such equipment. For instance, it was reported that Syria owed 3.6
billion USD to Russia for previous arms deals, yet Russia continued to supply the Syrian regime
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with advanced anti-aircraft systems and missiles such as SA-17 and SA-22 (artillery systems)103
while maneuvering away from UN embargoes, maintaining that the nature of such arms deals is
‘defensive’ for the sake of Syria. Following the outbreak of Syrian civil war that was
encompassed by an increasingly sectarian element, Iran alongside Russia quickly adapted the
position of a lifeline for the Syrian regime that was facing an immediate existential threat.
Consequently, Iran supplies Assad’s coercive apparatus with arm supplies entailing light arms,
advanced strategic weapons, hardware for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and an array of ballistic
missiles by either flying them into Syria through Iraqi airspace, or utilizing smuggling networks
through Turkey and Lebanon facilitated by Iranian airline companies such as Iran Air104. Iranian
support and investment into the survival of the Syrian regime thus far has been estimated to be
around 15 billion USD annually, not to mention Tehran’s support and dissemination of Shi’a

militias such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah that compromise nearly 80% of the Syrian regime’s
ground forces105.
Cooptation
The Hashemite regime in Jordan has long instrumentalized cooptation in minimizing and
deterring the mobilization of various opposition forces. This has been evident in the 1957
military coup attempt and the events known as Black September in 1970, both of which have
sought to topple the Hashemite throne. The key to the success of the Jordanian regime’s
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cooptation strategies lies in its strategic alliances that tie powerful actors with the regime such as
East Bankers and subsequently wealthy Palestinian businessmen with the implementation of neoliberal economic policies in the beginning of the 21st century under King Abdullah II’s reign.
In order to understand the successes of cooptation strategies and the nature of alliances
pursued by the regime to preserve political power, the ethnic composition of Jordan’s population
and its history must be discussed. Jordan’s population underwent drastic demographic changes
over the past decades, traditionally the population compromised of majority of various Bedouin
tribes scattered around southern provinces that were referred to as East Bankers or
Transjordanians, given their extensive presence in the region that predated the advent of the
Transjordan mandate under the British and its subsequent formation into the nation-state of
Jordan. They served as the traditional powerbase of the Hashemite regime beginning with King

Abdullah I, the founder of the Emirate of Trans-Jordan. In addition, small populations of Arab
Christians exist in the northern/ north western provinces as a result of Christian settlement from
other Levantine territories such as Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria in the past. However,
following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War an exodus of Palestinians began out of Palestine into
neighboring countries such as Jordan and Lebanon, given the systematic ethnic-cleansing
campaigns orchestrated by the newly established Israeli government in order to shift the ethnic
tides of the population in the nascent Israeli state in favor of the Jewish population at the expense
of the Palestinians that were massacred and forcibly displaced. Consequently, hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians fled into Jordan and thus sparking a massive demographic shift in the
local population where they subsequently formed 50% of the total Jordanian population at the
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time106. The demographic shift continued to expand following the advent of the Israeli state and
its persecution of Palestinians over the decades resulting in more Palestinians fleeing to Jordan,
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War further exacerbated this given Israel’s annexation of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip that were previously under Jordanian administration. The territorial losses of
Jordan and the aftermath of the 1967 war resulted in 355,000 Palestinian refugees heading to
Jordan107.
The population of Jordan is further compromised of other ethnic groups that exist in
minority such as Assyrians, Armenians, Kurds, and Circassians. However, they form a minute
proportion of the total population and have no potential or history of significant political
(exception of Circassians) nor economic power, thus for the purposes of this discussion
regarding cooptation the two main actors that will be discussed extensively are the Palestinians

and East Bankers.
The East Bankers have traditionally served as the backbone of the Jordanian regime
given their immediate reception of the Hashemites upon their arrival to Trans-Jordan and
continued loyalty to the throne, in fact the loyalty of the tribes was essential in aiding the
survival of the regime as it faced two major existential threats. On April 13th, 1957 in light of
rising radical pan-Arabists that were anti-monarchists, opposition forces in Jordan joined by
General Ali-Abu Nowar head of the Jordanian Army at the time and with the influence of
external actors (Syria, at the time of the coup it was reported that 3,000 Syrian troops moved
towards the Syrian-Jordanian border in support of the coup) orchestrated a coup attempt against
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King Hussein108. However, the coup attempt was thwarted given the loyalty of Bedouin units in
the army stationed in Zarqa that alerted King Hussein of the plot and immediately mobilized
against it, thus ensuring the survival of the Hashemite regime109. The dominance of Bedouins in
the Jordanian military is the legacy of Glubb who selectively recruited Bedouins. Another
instance highlighting the role of East Bankers in supporting the Hashemite regime as it faced
existential crises, is the events of Black September in 1970. As discussed previously in the
repression section, the Jordanian Armed Forces that predominantly consist of loyal East Bankers
under the leadership of King Hussein led a brutal military crackdown on the guerrilla forces of
the PLO, in response to the organization’s attempts to undermine Hashemite sovereignty in
Jordan thus leading to thousands of casualties.
In exchange for their loyalty to the throne, the East Bankers are guaranteed a monopoly

on political power compared to other demographics in Jordanian society. Hashemite rulers,
beginning with King Hussein ensured that loyal tribal elements would dominate senior positions
in parliament, the military, and the various branches of the regime’s coercive apparatus. In
addition, employment within the public sector is favored towards East Bankers who maintain
exclusive access to employment opportunities based on tribal affiliations. This created a system
of ‘wasta’ which translates into ‘connection’, this system fueled by tribal politics, affiliations and
the primacy of East Bankers infiltrated all aspects of Jordanian society since its conception,
influencing matters such as employment, access to contracts, and even legal loopholes such as
evading arrests. Not to mention, that it is arguably the primary contributor to the
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underdevelopment of institutions and civil society in Jordan, as it serves as a governing
mechanism that favors tribal politics over other civil forms. Regardless, the system is the legacy
of the powerful alliance and its fruition between the Hashemite rulers and East Bankers who
have traditionally and continue to serve as the regime’s backbone, specifically in times of crisis
as witnessed in 1957 and 1970.
Evidence of the East Bankers’ loyalty to the Hashemite throne continue to be found in
recent times under King Abdullah II’s reign, specifically in times of regional political turmoil
that have the potential for spillover effects such as the Arab uprisings where small scale protests
and opposition mobilized against the regime, hence prompting loyal tribal elements to
immediately rally in support of the regime while renewing their allegiance to the king. An
example of such is one of the largest and most powerful tribes in Jordan, ‘Bani Hassan’, that

denounced the events of the regional Arab uprising as ‘destabilizing aimed at furthering selfish
private interests rather than the public good’ while condemning the tribal elements that
mobilized in opposition of the king, claiming that they do not represent Jordan’s tribes that are
loyal to the Hashemite rule that is said to be ‘a symbol of Jordanian pride and unity’110.
Nevertheless, the so-called backbone of the Hashemite regime faced serious blows in
recent decades under the tenure of King Abdullah II that implemented neo liberal economic
reforms aimed at modernizing the economy, subsequently jeopardizing the economic gains of the
East Bankers and ultimately undermining their traditionally dominant position in society.
Consequently, grievances fomenting among various tribal sources have resulted in the surfacing
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of opposition and dissent against both the government and the king directly, this is evident in the
creation of the ‘Hirak Movement’ entailing nearly 40 tribal youth activists groups representing
rural communities111, fueled by grievances joined forces with other opposition units (peasantry,
Muslim Brotherhood) in protests chanting slogans directly against the monarch demanding
serious political reform or threatening similar outcomes to other regimes in neighboring Arab
nations112.
The relationship between Jordan’s tribes and the Hashemites shifted drastically following
2011 regional political turmoil, influx of refugees and continuously deteriorating economic
situation (soaring poverty and unemployment rates) compounded by a public perception of state
mismanagement of funds, as well as high levels of corruption fueled resentment among the
bedrock support of the monarchy113, thus spurring prominent tribal figures to organize protests

and continuously challenge the regime including its legitimacy. Fares Al-Fayez, one of the most
prominent opposition political activists in Jordan and member of Bani Sakhir tribe, publicly
called out the king for acting as a ‘demi-god’ while demanding for serious political reform that
involved curtailing some of the king’s executive powers, he further added that ‘we will not
accept you’ while challenging the legitimacy of Hashemite rule by claiming that ‘the country is
ours, the land is ours’ and that the king, his father and great grandfather ‘came to us from Hijaz’
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implying that the Hashemite dynasty is foreign in Jordan and its legitimacy is based on a contract
between the tribes and the Hashemites, hence Al-Fayez’s remarks ‘You owe us, we don’t owe
you’114. Al-Fayez was arrested following his speech, thus sparking outrage among his tribe that
threatened to ‘shake the pillars of the Jordanian state’ if he was not released immediately, these
sentiments were echoed by Al-Fayez’s son, Mujhem, who threatened that the Bani Sakhir tribe
would block main roads between the capital and Madaba, in addition to disrupting flights from
Jordan’s main airport if his father was not released115.
The other domain of cooptation utilized by the Jordanian regime entails Jordanians of
Palestinian origins that constitute an economic elite, given their dominance in the private sector
of the economy. The economic strength of the Palestinians stems from the legacy of the
government patronage system installed by the regime that facilitated the primacy of

Transjordanians in many domains of Jordanian life while simultaneously discriminated against
Palestinians. Moreover, following the events of the 1970 civil war, the regime orchestrated
‘Jordanization’ programs that purged the civil service, political institutions, army, press, and
public sector from Palestinians116. Therefore, following their marginalization and status as
political minority despite occupying a demographic majority, the Palestinians were forced to
dominate the private sector within a generation given that they were better educated and more
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professionally skilled than Transjordanians. Not to mention, that Palestinians had access to the
labor markets of oil producing gulf states in the 1970s117.
Nonetheless, the economic rise and dominance of the Palestinians did not carry any
political significance nor gains over the decades as they remained marginalized from the centers
of political power in Jordan up until King Abdullah II’s ascension to the throne. The new king’s
implementation of policies aimed at liberalizing the economy and neoliberal cooptation
strategies encompassing social entrepreneurs’ networks laid down the framework, whereby
certain wealthy Palestinian entrepreneurs were able to begin converting their economic might
into political power, as they drew closer to the regime and monarch himself. Entrepreneurs such
as Ghassan Nuqul, Maher Kaddoura, and Dina Shoman were placed at the helm of the Jordanian
social entrepreneurs network as decision makers, they influenced and supported handpicked

social entrepreneurs118. The Jordanian monarch and his loyal business elites carefully monitor
and control the development of the SEN to “create a new generation of socio-economic elites,
and thus, target the co-optation of hand-picked social entrepreneurs and their alignment to the
political and economic agenda.”119 This is primarily advanced by local initiatives such as
KAAYIA (King Abdullah II Award for Youth Innovation and Development) and awards
founded by royal decree such as KAFD (King Abdullah II Fund for Development), these awards
place emphasis on the entrepreneur as an individual rather than the enterprise for the purpose of
cooptation as a means of forging a new generation of socio-economic elites that are in line both
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politically and economically with the ruler. Hence, the neoliberal restructuring of Jordan’s
economy has enabled the authoritarian renewal of the Jordanian regime through the lens of social
entrepreneurship networks and youth empowerment.
Despite the Syrian regime demonstrating both an unrelenting will and unrestrictive
capacity in repressing all forms of opposition, its survival both historically and thus far cannot be
solely attributed to repression. In fact, the Syrian regime is arguably held together by cooptation
strategies facilitated through corporatism and neo patrimonial rule maintained by what Kevin
Mazur terms as ‘informal networks of linkage’120. Such strategies were adopted by various
authoritarian regimes rising to power in the Arab World that aimed at consolidating political
power and control over society while developing a weakly industrialized economy, this is
evident in Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Algeria that were ruled by socialist regimes that attempted to

implement bold modernization programs in the latter half of the 20th century121.
In order to comprehend the cooptation strategies pursued by the Syrian regime, the ethnic
composition of the Syrian population and its subsequent division into classes accordingly must
be explored. The heterogeneity of the Syrian population emanates from differences along
religious and ethnic lines, Syrians can be broadly attributed to one of the three major religious
groups in the country either Sunni Muslims, Christians and one of the various variations of the
‘Islamic religions’ (Alawis, Druze, and Isma’ili’s)122. Other religious groups exist such as the
Yezidis and Shi’ite Muslims yet their numbers constitute a miniscule portion of the Syrian
population. As for ethnic affiliations, Syrians are predominantly Arabs with sizeable portions of
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the population being Kurds or non-Arab Christians, such as the Assyrians (whose presence in the
region outdates the advent of Islam and the subsequent Arab conquests) and Armenians (who
have fled genocide perpetrated by the Ottomans in the early 20th century). Other ethnic groups
exist in minority such as Turkomans and Circassians who have been residing in Syria since the
days of Ottoman rule123.
Historically prior to the 20th century Sunni Arabs existed as the prime economic
and social actors in Syria given their class background as urban merchants, landowners and
Muslim scholars, thus dominating political life up until the rise of the Ba’athists124. However, it
must be noted that a majority of the Sunni population did not possess economic nor political
power given the diversity in class backgrounds and regional locations, some resided in cities and
served as merchants while others existed in more rural regions and served as peasants or simple

tribesmen. Christians did occupy certain prominent positions within the realms of governance
and commerce, yet they have never possessed any form of executive power. The dominion of
Sunni Muslims over political life persisted during the imperial rule of both the Ottomans and the
French that delegated special roles for them as local power brokers tasked with maintaining
stability125. Nevertheless, this political system where Sunni Muslims occupied prominent roles
within the realm of politics was shattered with the decline of imperial rule in the Middle East and
the subsequent rise of Arab nationalism, resulting in the political mobilization of rural areas in
Syria under the Communists, Ba’athists, and Arab Socialists126. This was further compounded by
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the formation of the United Arab Republic where Syria merged with Egypt under the rule of
Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1958, the Arab nationalist project of the UAR was short-lived as
Nasser’s policies entailing the alienation of Syrian political actors and ambitious nationalization
policies resulted in a military coup that paved pathway for the rise of the Ba’athists, in addition
to the implementation of a political culture dominated by the Alawi minority in Syria that still
persists today under Assads regime.
The primary mechanism driving cooptation in the Syrian regime involves an intertwined
relationship between informal networks and the ethnic nature of the regime. While the ethnic
component of the Syrian regime maybe contested among scholars, it is undoubtedly true that
those surrounding the epicenter of political power in Syria stem from the Alawites minority, to
which both Hafez and Bashar Assad belong. As mentioned earlier in the literature review, this is

evident in senior positions within the coercive apparatus of the Syrian regime during Hafez
Assad’s reign, Hafez exclusively appointed Alawite supporters deemed loyal to fill in director
positions within the different intelligence agencies relating to the Syrian coercive apparatus, such
as Mohammed Nasif Kheirbek, a member of an Alawite clan closely affiliated with the
Assads127. Furthermore, public employment is dominated by Alawites that gain exclusive access
to personal networks (obtained through connections to an immediate family member such as a
cousin or uncle)128 that facilitate employment opportunities within the public sector, that are at
the minimum unavailable to non-Alawites or much more difficult to access. However, it must be
additionally considered that elite actors in Syria that are entrenched deep within the regime are
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not necessarily limited to Alawites, in fact several Sunnis occupied prominent positions within
the regime such as Mustafa Tlass that served as a former Minister of Defense, Rustum Ghazaleh,
former chief of Political Security, and Ali Mamluk, former head of the Syrian General
Intelligence Directorate ‘mukhabarat’129.
The Syrian regime pursued coalition building with various segments of Syrian society
that expanded beyond the Alawi minority and different elite actors through establishing informal
networks with various local communities, thus contributing to the regime survival over the past
decades by minimizing cross-societal mobilization of opposition. For instance, during the reign
of Hafez Assad the Syrian regime underwent several “modernization projects served as vehicles
for development of clientelistic linkages between the Syrian state and local communities”130. The
establishment of the Peasants’ Union facilitated state regulation into agriculture affairs

specifically grazing lands, through delegating cooperative tribal leaders that served as
intermediaries between the regime and peasants, hence serving as a “a means of handing out
patronage goods”131. Moreover, the regime employed elite clientelism to establish coalitions
with non-political elite actors in Syria, this applies specifically to the local realm of business.
Business clientelism was achieved through regime efforts in establishing links with families or
individuals through informal deals that involved personal relations with businessmen and regime
figures. For instance, the regime would promote opportunities and deals for regime linked
businessmen in exchange for support and a portion of the revenue earned, the regime required
foreign companies operating in Syria to have local partners, these partners are typically regime
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linked businessmen who in exchange for such opportunities end up overcharging foreign
companies for basic services such as rental of governmental lands then sharing the rent with
regime figures or officials132. Business clientelism is not limited to Alawite families or
individuals, in fact a significant portion of the beneficiaries of this strategy are Sunni Muslims
that have backgrounds linked with the regime such as the sons of Mustafa Tlass. In addition, this
form of clientelism maintains a regional dimension that further transcends the ethnic nature of
the regime, whereby linkages and networks established between the regime and loyal business
men were more prominent in major cities that maintained high economic and trade activity such
as Aleppo and Damascus. This form of coalition cements the interests of nonpolitical elite with
that of the political elite, hence acting as a mechanism for preventing and controlling internal
elite dissent.

The effectiveness of cooptation strategies pursued by the Syrian regime beginning from
the reign of Hafez and persisting into Bashar’s enabled minimization of opposition mobilization
in the face of the Arab Uprisings in 2011. This was achieved through networks established
between the state and local communities that provided material benefits for individuals and
families whether informally or formally linked to the regime, hence incentivizing certain local
communities to refrain from mobilizing in support of the opposition in fear of losing access to
material benefits that were regularly provided before the uprising, as well as access to the
networks that provide a wide variety of privileges. This was further facilitated through
intermediaries, that acted as informal regime policing mechanisms that controlled dissent within
their own communities given their linkages to the state. Therefore, “populations with greater

132

Ibid, p.81

66

state linkage, including non-Sunni local communities, Sunni local communities of tribal
background, and those with high levels of government employment, participated at
systematically lower rates than other communities in the uprising’s first six months.”133
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CONCLUSION

The resiliency of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East is rooted in three main pillars
of legitimation, repression and cooptation. The empirical discussion confirms some hypotheses
on the mechanisms of such pillars while offering new insights that tend to be overlooked.
Legitimation has historically been and continues to be a foundation in the Hashemite regime in
Jordan given unique ancestral links and genealogical links to the most supreme religious and
cultural historical figure in the region, Prophet Muhammad. The Hashemites employed such
legitimacy claims as a means of gaining an edge over other tribes and dynasties in the region in
an ascent to power, even today the monarch and his regime continue to implement symbols and
rhetoric within the public sphere to emphasize the legitimacy of Hashemite rule domestically,
regionally, and even internationally as observed by King Abdullah II’s rejection of the Abraham
Accords under the Trump administration. Contrarily, despite the Syrian regime attempting to
utilize various legitimation tactics such as the regime campaign in painting the image of Bashar
as a pious Muslim that regularly attends prayers at the mosque, such tactics were ultimately
unsuccessful given the artificial nature of the cult of personality of Assad that is strictly
contingent on the state’s coercive capacity.

Repression has proven to occupy a greater role in the resiliency of the monarchical
regime in Jordan than initially anticipated, despite its image as a liberal regime and favorite
among Western governments. This has been demonstrated in the regime’s expanding repressive
capacity in recent years following the events of the Arab Spring and the subsequent regional
political turmoil that has left several age-old autocratic regimes deposed, hence the Jordanian
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regime under pressure and fears of suffering a similar outcome has increased its crackdown on
all forms of dissent emanating from all segments of society aimed against the existing political
order under the monarch. This ranges from the silencing of local critics abroad in neighborly
authoritarian regimes (Ahmad El Otoum) to the forced closure of the Teachers ’Syndicate in
response to organized protests, and the house arrest of the king’s half-brother whom allegedly
conspired with both local and foreign actors in a coup attempt against the reigning monarch. The
analysis additionally reveals that a great degree of the regime’s repressive capacity is directly
financed and supported by foreign allies such as the United States, the primary benefactor and
donor to Jordan’s coercive apparatus. As expected, repression was instrumental to the survival of
the Assad regime in Syria as it faced existential threats, most notably during the onset of the
Syrian civil war where the regime immediately unleashed the full destructive scale of its

repressive capacity on opposition forces ranging from indiscriminate shelling and dropping of
barrel bombs on civilian areas to unleashing chemical agents in local towns and cities, resulting
in thousands of civilian casualties. There is no shortage of evidence documenting the role of
repression in the survival of the Assad regime in Syria, both in terms of scale and capacity as
evident by countless international media coverage, UN commissions, and leaks from regime
defectors such as the Caesar photographs. The repressive capacity of the Syrian regime was
further fortified by foreign actors such as Russia that provided air power as well as arms, and
Iran that smuggled sophisticated weaponry into Syria for the regime’s use in addition to
providing ground troops in the form of Iranian-backed militias.
Cooptation served as the primal foundation of the Hashemite regime since its genesis in
the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921, more so arguably than legitimation. This is rooted in the
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powerful alliance between the Hashemites starting from the Jordanian state’s founder King
Abdullah I and the Transjordanian tribes of the south, that recognized the monarchical rule of the
Hashemites and pledged allegiance in exchange for benefits and protection of the interests of the
tribes. Consequently, the regime under King Hussein engineered and adopted a government
patronage system that ensured Transjordanians would dominate the centers of political power
(civil service, military, public sector and senior positions in coercive apparatus) despite shifting
demographic tides and the subsequent economic rise of the Palestinians, thus ensuring the
primacy of Transjordanians in various domains in Jordanian life while politically alienating
Palestinians. However, the empirical analysis additionally reveals the increased erosion of
cooptation as a strategy for regime survival in Jordan specifically in recent times, given the
neoliberal economic restructuring and modernization policies undertaken in the reign of King

Abdullah II. Hence, such policies have come at the expense of the economic benefits of
Transjordanians while paving the path for the conversion of economic power to political clout of
certain Palestinian actors as witnessed in local Social Entrepreneur Networks.
The deteriorating economic condition compounded by a rampant rise of corruption under
the reign of King Abdullah II, in addition to his controversial economic policies ebbed away
support from the same tribal elements the Hashemite regime has historically relied on to survive
in the face of existential threats. Thus, revealing cracks in what has been long referred as the
bedrock of the monarchy in Jordan. In recent years opposition challenging the regime and its
legitimacy have been increasingly fomenting and erupting among various prominent tribes that
were once considered unconditionally loyal to the throne threatening the outbreak of social and
political turmoil, such developments shed the light on the effectiveness of cooptation in the
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Jordan and questions its utility as it is in the future and the concurrent increase in repression, thus
suggesting a shift in the dynamics of authoritarian rule in Jordan where the regime may have to
increasingly rely on repression as a primary tool of survival as it faces more serious threats such
as the failed coup in 2021.
Similarly, cooptation in Syria has been foundational to the Assad regime dating to
Hafez’s reign who carefully selected members of his own ethnic community, Alawites to occupy
prominent roles within his regimes, most notable senior positions within the military, security
forces and intelligence agencies. The ethnic nature of the Assad regime is no coincidence, rather
a strategic cooptation strategy that ensured internal elite dissent against the ruler was minimized.
Furthermore, the regime’s instrumentalization of business clientelism that ensured the cooptation
of non-political elites including non-Alawites such as Sunni businessmen further fortified the

cohesion of elites within the regime, this cemented the economic interests of the business elite
with the status quo of the regime given exclusive access to deals and trade opportunities. Not to
mention, the establishment of informal networks scattered throughout various communities
through linking regime elements with intermediaries, that additionally acted as an implicit
policing mechanism controlling dissent within their respective communities.
While the thesis primarily examined the mechanics behind authoritarian regime survival
in Syria and Jordan, the findings can be expanded to offer an insightful framework into the
resiliency of authoritarian rule in some Middle Eastern regimes and its collapse in others,
specifically during the events of the Arab Uprisings in 2011 that posed the most significant
existential threat to authoritarianism in the Middle East to this day. Legitimation, repression and
cooptation are employed by all authoritarian regimes in the region as mechanisms of governance

71

and instruments of survival in the face of threats. Religious legitimacy has long been
instrumentalized by the royal family in Morocco against Islamist threats134 and to consolidate
public support. Similar to the Hashemites in Jordan, the Alawite ruling dynasty in Morocco
claim to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad hence granting them special privileges to govern
according Islamic tradition. Not only does the monarch claim genealogical links to prophet
Muhammad but traces its lineage to the fourth caliph in Islam, Ali bin Abi Talib via the Idrisid
dynasty135. Hence, the regime in Morocco relies on historical-religious claims to justify and
propagate its rule.
Repression is the backbone of all authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, its
employment has been extensively or at a minimum partially documented from Morocco to Iran.
Bellin highlights the instrumentalization of repression to facilitate authoritarianism across

various regimes in the Middle East through the presence of a coercive apparatus entailing
security forces, intelligence units and the military under the helm of the autocrat. In Saudi
Arabia, the regime frequently unleashes its repressive capacity on its Shi’ite minority population
concentrated in the eastern region of Qatif, resulting in the militarization of the region through a
heavy presence of security forces that closely surveil the region and violently suppresses
demonstrations inspired by the Arab Uprisings in 2011136. This resulted in dozens of civilian
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injuries, deaths and detainments of Shi’ites as political prisoners that are typically charged under
terrorism acts or espionage as Iranian agents137, thus resulting in death penalties and
consequently executed by the state. Similarly, the regime in Bahrain heavily relied on repression
as a means of survival in the face of mass popular uprisings primarily carried out by the nations
Shi’ite majority and emboldened by the wave of pro-democracy protests that swept the Arab
world in 2011. The regimes response was violent entailing the use of live ammunition on
protestors by security forces, detainments and exiles of opposition figures. In addition, the
monarchical regime invited foreign troops originating from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to aid its
efforts in crushing dissent138. The regime continues to detain, torture, exile and force confessions
out of opposition figures as a means of stifling dissent and ensuring regime survival.
As for cooptation, its employment as an instrument of regime survival is evident across

some of the Arab Gulf states in response to the growing political threat of the Muslim
Brotherhood. In Bahrain, a powerful alliance exists between the Al Khalifa ruling family and the
Muslim Brotherhood given the sectarian dimensions of political opposition that emanates from
the country’s Shi’ite population. The Muslim Brotherhood’s political extension in Bahrain exists
in the form of a bloc known as ‘Al Minbar Islamic Society’ that continually support the
monarchy’s positions and policies in parliament139. The party is believed to be supported by the
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Bahraini Royal court140 and its government support is viewed as an effort by the regime to
counter Shi’ite political mobilization. In Qatar, the regime has adopted a form of cooperative
cooptation in regards to the Muslim Brotherhood given the regime’s relatively peaceful
experience with the Muslim Brotherhood141. This is a byproduct of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Qatar limiting its activities to social reform such as promoting Islamic education142, rather than
attacking the political structure and seeking participation through mobilization. Hence, despite
not having an official chapter, the Muslim Brotherhood is allowed by the regime to operate in
Qatar given its voluntary self-isolation from the Qatari political realm.
Nevertheless, the three pillars of authoritarian resiliency crumbled in the face of
opposition in regimes such as Egypt and Tunisia that underwent regime change, given the
ousting of Mubarak and Ben Ali by waves of mass protests that swept both countries and ignited

the revolutionary bandwagon of the Arab Spring. In Egypt, the fate of the Mubarak’s brutal
dictatorship came down to a major blow dealt to the regime’s coercive apparatus and hence
repressive capacity, this blow originated from the Egyptian military defecting from Mubarak’s
orders and abstaining from suppressing mass protests. This not only signified a diminishing in
the state’s repressive capacity but a failure in cooptation with non-political elite, specifically the
military establishment that ultimately decided to abandon Mubarak’s regime and maintain a
neutral position that may have appeared to favor the Egyptian protestors, people and overall
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public sentiment. Similarly, in Tunisia the scope of mass mobilization and public protests that
called for the overthrow of the regime exceeded the regime’s repressive capacity, thus leading to
the escape and exile of Ben Ali and his family to Saudi Arabia.
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